Nepalese Maoists strike for integration of Maoist soldiers into Nepal's security
Summary
From May 2009 to May 2010, the UCPN(Maoist) ran a four-phase campaign demanding integration of former Maoist combatants into Nepal’s army, culminating in two 28-kilometer human chains around Kathmandu, the prime minister’s resignation, and partial integration of 1,460 of 19,000 former Maoist fighters into the national security forces. [source: nv-database]
Tactics used
Tactics used
- general-strike
- mass-rally
- sit-down
- human-chain
Background
Nepal’s 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended a ten-year civil war that had killed over 13,000 people but left 19,000 former Maoist combatants sequestered in U.N.-monitored barracks awaiting integration into the national army. [source: nv-database] Army Chief Rookmangud Katawal blocked the process, claiming Maoist soldiers were politically indoctrinated. [source: nv-database] Maoists won the April 2008 constituent assembly and made Prachanda prime minister in August; when Prachanda fired Katawal in May 2009, President Yadav reversed the dismissal, and Prachanda resigned and pulled the UCPN(M) party from the coalition. [source: nv-database]
What happened
Nepalese Maoists strike for integration of Maoist soldiers into Nepal’s security — Ananta Bhadra Lamichhane from Kathmandu, Nepal (CC BY 2.0). Source: nepalese-maoists-strike-integration-maoist-soldiers-nepals-security-forces-2009.jpg
Phase two (November 2009) brought tens of thousands into Kathmandu for three days of motorcades and torch rallies; phase three (December) declared 13 symbolic autonomous ethnic states; phase four (21 December) launched a three-day general strike that paralyzed all major roads. [source: nv-database] Police fired tear gas and beat protesters with batons on the first day, arresting 70, but on 22 December an estimated 4,000 marchers continued and on 23 December scores of sit-downs filled key intersections. [source: nv-database]
By January 2010 the Maoists demanded a new Maoist-led government on civilian-supremacy grounds and added symbolic public burning of Indo-Nepal treaties along the border. [source: nv-database] The decisive May 2010 phase brought 100,000-plus villagers and laborers into Kathmandu, stockpiling rice in wedding halls and schools, blocking 18 key intersections with sit-downs accompanied by music and dance, and on 3 May forming two 28-kilometer human chains around the capital — the largest mobilisation in Nepali history. [source: nv-database] Anti-Maoist forces counter-rallied on 7 May and attacked Maoist encampments, but the protesters drowned out the provocations with more music. [source: nv-database] On 30 June 2010 Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal resigned; parliament later agreed to integrate 1,460 of the 19,000 former Maoist fighters, with 70 at officer rank. [source: nv-database]
Key people & organizations
- Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) — UCPN(Maoist) chair
- President Ram Baran Yadav (opponent)
- Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal (resigned 30 June 2010)
- Army Chief Rookmangud Katawal (blocked integration)
- Coalition of Nepal’s three other large parties (anti-Maoist opponents)
- India (perceived foreign counter-pressure)
Outcome
Verdict: partial. (6/10 on the GNVAD scale.)
The campaign grew significantly across four phases and Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal did resign (announced 30 June 2010, though he stayed until February 2011 due to a leadership dispute); only some 1,460 of 19,000 former combatants were eventually integrated (with 70 at officer rank). The Maoists did not gain exclusive control of government. [source: nv-database]
Lessons
- A multi-phase campaign over many months keeps the opposition off-balance and allows tactical learning without burning out a single tactic.
- Sit-downs combined with music and dance (rather than silence) subverted the militarized framing the opponent tried to apply.
- A two-by-twenty-eight-kilometer human chain around a capital city is a powerful symbolic and logistical move — “kettling” the state within its own ring-road.
- Even an extensive, multi-month mobilization may convert only a minority of the original demand; measuring partial wins against the original ask is essential for morale.
- Sustained overt protest can only deliver limited concessions when the cross-party elite is unified against you and an external power (here, India) leans against the campaign.
Sources
- Global Nonviolent Action Database — Nepalese Maoists strike for integration of Maoist soldiers into Nepal’s security forces, 2009 —
[[nv-database]]
Disclaimer: Included as a teaching example of campaign craft, not as endorsement.
Sources & verification
nv-database— grounding: primary — license: link-only