Black Rhodesian railroad workers strike for better pay, 1945
Summary
The Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association (RRAEA) was formed in spring 1944 in response to poor working conditions, and soon grew to include several hundred members, most of them in the hub city of Bulawayo. [source: nv-database]
Tactics used
Tactics used
Background
Workers in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, bore an increased workload to support the war effort during WWII. As extraction of mineral resources increased, employees of Rhodesia Railways worked upward of 65 hours per week to transport the minerals to ports on the Indian Ocean. While white European railway workers had strong unions representing them, black African employees received inferior treatment and lower pay grades than whites. [source: nv-database]
What happened
The Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association (RRAEA) was formed in spring 1944 in response to poor working conditions, and soon grew to include several hundred members, most of them in the hub city of Bulawayo. By 1945, it had submitted many written requests to the company, all of which were ignored. Company managers believed Africans were incapable of organizing themselves to demand more rights. On September 27, 1945, Rhodesia Railways management decided to standardize the formerly disorganized overtime compensation policy for black employees. Although the company claimed that the change represented an improvement for most workers, and asserted after the fact that it immediately communicated the new policy to its employees, black employees denied being informed about the change. The miscommunication may have resulted from an unequal, intimidating work environment in which superiors would regularly “joke” about firing employees or cutting wages. Any actual attempts to inform workers of a changed policy may not have been taken seriously. In any case, black employees were not aware of the change, which for some caused a wage decrease, until October 19. The next day, when monthly wages were calculated, several hundred employees at a material routing station in Bulawayo left their workstations and converged on the office of the “Supervisor of Natives,” Harold Farrar. Farrar heard their requests for an explanation, but refused to engage in any discussion. In fact, Farrar missed an opportunity to explain that the new policy would raise wages for lower-paid employees. He invited dissatisfied employees to speak to the General Manager, W.J. Skillicorn, but asked that they not mention his (Farrar’s) name. The workers then proceeded to the Rhodesia Railways headquarters at Metcalfe Square. They peacefully waited outside the door as Farrar, having thought better of sending over two hundred angry men to his boss’s office, ran inside to consult with Skillicorn. Farrar returned with a message from the General Manager: “You may wait here for six months but you will not see him. You are wasting your time.” The crowd lingered for a while longer, then returned home. The next morning, October 21, a large number of workers gathered in one of the employee housing compounds and resolved to strike the next day. Some members of the relatively small RRAEA gave leadership to the strikers, but other leaders were not RRAEA members. Leaders judged that alcohol would be detrimental to the behavior of strikers, and thus ordered that beer-making equipment be removed from housing compounds for the duration of the strike. Huxtable, the “Native Commissioner” of Bulawayo, addressed the crowd in an attempt to discourage the strike, but the workers simply ignored him. On Monday morning, October 22, every one of the 2,708 black railway workers in Bulawayo went on strike. Picketers met incoming trains and convinced the black employees on them to join the strike. In mid-morning, General Manager Skillicorn addressed an assembly of workers and told them that, although he was willing to negotiate, he could not do so while the strike was on. The next day, the workers sent a delegation to Skillicorn’s office with their statement of demands. This time, Skillicorn agreed to meet with them. The strikers demanded, in order: (1) a five-fold increase in wages, to a level that would nevertheless be below a European worker’s salary, (2) a return to the former overtime pay guidelines, (3) to always be paid in cash rather than food rations, and (4) a termination of the office of the Supervisor of Natives. In response, Skillicorn reiterated that he would not negotiate before strikers went back to work. The strike continued on Tuesday and Wednesday, with the strikers holding daily meetings to emphasize their organization and resolve. On Wednesday, the strike spread beyond Bulawayo to railway workers in Gwelo, Selukwe, Fort Victoria, Salisbury, and the Wankie colliery. The few workers who actually traveled on the trains had spread news of the strike to these locations. Even more workers joined the strike on Thursday, bringing the total amount of strikers to around 80% of the company’s 10,000 black employees. With the expansion of the strike through the Southern Rhodesian railway system, company management and colonial officials began to fear the possibility of a general strike across all industries. The strike also took a significant toll on the daily operations of the Rhodesian economy. Limited shipping by train continued with the labor of white workers, convicts, and some blacks, but supplies of staple foods and coal dwindled nevertheless. Colonial Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins, having been notified by the Electricity Commission that power plants were running out of their coal reserves, decided on Thursday that the government needed to intervene. His administration promised to appoint an independent investigatory commission into railway labor conditions if the strike ended. Fearing that they would lose their leverage if they abandoned the strike, strike leaders in Bulawayo—known as the “Commission of 18”—refused the offer on Friday, October 26, and suggested instead that the commission convene while the strike was still occurring. Most other railway depots followed the lead of Bulawayo, with the exception of workers at the Wankie colliery, who returned to work in response to the government’s offer. Pressure on Rhodesia Railways and the government increased on Saturday with the publication of the 18-month correspondence between RRAEA and the company. These letters completely disproved Skillicorn’s prior statements that the striker’s demands had not been previously articulated to him. [source: nv-database]
Key people & organizations
- Members of the Rhodesia Railways African Employees Association (RRAEA)
- The leadership “Committee of 18” included some workers that were not from the RRAEA
Outcome
Verdict: partial.
GNVAD scoring: 2 out of 6 points Survival 1 out of 1 points Growth 3 out of 3 points Total points 6 out of 10 points [source: nv-database]
The independent commission established as a result of the strike raised the workers’ wages by 25-30%, improved sick leave practices, and weakened the power of the Supervisor of Natives. However, the wage increase fell far short of the requested amount, and other requests, including the right to be paid in cash instead of rations, were not met. [source: nv-database]
Lessons
- Sustained nonviolent action by organised workers or citizens can extract concessions from entrenched political or economic opponents. [source: nv-database]
- Internal organising across multiple sites or sectors amplifies pressure on a single opponent. [source: nv-database]
- External solidarity — regional, transnational, or movement-led — broadens a campaign’s reach and durability. [source: nv-database]
Sources
- Global Nonviolent Action Database — Black Rhodesian railroad workers strike for better pay, 1945 —
[[nv-database]]
Disclaimer: Included as a teaching example of campaign craft, not as endorsement.
Sources & verification
nv-database— grounding: primary — license: link-only (CC-BY-NC-ND-3.0)- Verified 2026-07-04 against
RAW/black-rhodesian-railroad-workers-strike-better-pay-1945.md.